2009/05/01 by Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc · 3 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
paper · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/86/30007
openalex publication_date 2009/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
We show that strategy-independent adaptations of random interaction networks can induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection, which promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanisms emerge spontaneously as dynamical processes due to deletions and additions of links, which are performed whenever players adopt new strategies and after a certain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency of cooperation promotion, as well as the mechanism responsible for it, can thereby be tuned via a single parameter determining the frequency of link additions. We thus demonstrate that coevolving random networks may evoke an appropriate mechanism for each social dilemma, such that cooperation prevails even in highly unfavorable conditions.