1997/09/01 by Amy Farmer, Jill Tiefenthaler · 4 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Family Dynamics and Relationships #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Taxation and Compliance Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/00346769700000004
crossref issued 1997/09/01 · crossref published 1997/09/01 · crossref published-print 1997/09/01 · openalex publication_date 1997/09/01 · crossref published-online 2006/07/29 · crossref created 2011/09/20 · crossref deposited 2020/08/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31 · crossref indexed 2026/07/31
While economists have been studying the family as an economic unit for almost thirty years, most models have focused on cooperative family units. Domestic violence, one of the most widespread violent crimes against women, is one example of a family unit that is better explained as a noncooperative re1ationship. In this paper, a noncooperative model of domestic violence is presented. The comparative statics from this model predict that women's incomes and other financial support received from outside the marriage (family, welfare, shelters, divorce settlements, etc.) will decrease the level of violence in intact families because they increase the woman's threat point. Implications of the theoretical model are discussed and empirical evidence is summarized. The results from existing and new analysis provide support for the hypothesis that improved economic opportunities for women will decrease the level of violence in abusive re1ationships.