2022/08/31 by Jack Santucci · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Political and Economic history of UK and US #Electoral Systems and Political Participation
paper · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197630655.003.0007
openalex publication_date 2022/08/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Abstract This chapter uses roll-call and electoral data to analyze “polarizing” episodes in three key cases. Two of these, Cincinnati and New York City, have been prominent in STV historiography. A third, Worcester (MA), reveals the same basic patterns. Legislative roll rates, transfer-leakage rates, and visual evidence of realignment predict repeal efforts. They also account for passing observations, in STV historiography, about the behavior of key players. Repeal efforts do not succeed when third parties and/or independents offset defections from “good government” parties. A fourth case, Cambridge (MA), does not repeal STV despite experiencing similar levels of transfer leakage. Rather, the “good government” group begins to limit nominations. Anecdotes suggest similar problems in other cities. Nationally, movement leaders and political scientists come to see STV as a problematic way to deliver minority representation.