2026/02/08 by Erasmus Häggblom, Bjorn Kleizen, Wouter Van Dooren · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Public Policy and Administration Research #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Social Capital and Networks
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/padm.70048
openalex publication_date 2026/02/08 · openalex created_date 2026/02/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/22
ABSTRACT This study uses a budget game experiment to study the effects of active engagement with performance information on citizens' trust in public services and voice behavior regarding those services. Participants reviewed performance information on two fictional schools, one low‐performing and one high‐performing, after which some participants played the budget game. Participants who participated in the game expressed lower trust in and higher subjective voice regarding both the low‐performing and high‐performing school than participants given only a short description of the schools, with a particularly strong effect on the higher‐performing school. Playing the game also decreased the negative effects of performance information on the lower‐performing school. The results suggest that actively engaged citizens are more likely to view service performance in a negative manner, but also that active engagement reduces the perceived differences between high‐performing and low‐performing services.