2025/04/12 by Peter Edward Doe, Doe, Peter
Social Sciences · #FOS: Economics and business #Global Educational Reforms and Inequalities #School Choice and Performance #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2504.09357
openalex publication_date 2025/04/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools. However, because priorities are the amalgamation of multiple policy goals, some may be more flexible than others. This paper introduces a model that distinguishes between two types of priority: a between-group priority that ranks groups of students and must be respected, and a within-group priority for efficiently allocating seats within each group. The solution I introduce, the unified core, integrates both types. I provide a two-stage algorithm, the DA-TTC, that implements the unified core and generalizes both the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. This approach provides a method for improving efficiency in school choice while honoring policymakers' objectives.