2025/09/23 by Marco Faravelli, Umair Khalil, Sundar Ponnusamy · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Gender Politics and Representation #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
paper · doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf094
openalex publication_date 2025/09/23 · openalex created_date 2025/11/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23
Abstract A procedural rule in Indian elections requires candidates to pay a nominal deposit, which is forfeited on obtaining fewer than one-sixth of the votes. Forfeiture diminishes female recontesting by 13.3 percentage points in the following election (relative effect size of 68%). We find no such effects for men. These effects are persistent and discourage female candidates in the long term as well. States with more regressive gender norms exhibit stronger findings, with female forfeiters also being 11.8 percentage points less likely to win the following election. We enhance our analysis by conducting a survey experiment with representative voters.