2025/11/28 by Keith Raymond Harris · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2579930
openalex created_date 2025/11/28 · openalex publication_date 2025/11/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
It is commonly claimed, based in large part on survey data, that we now face a crisis of trust characterised in part by a lack of epistemic trust in experts and mainstream media institutions. Such claims have been met with competing data suggesting robust popular trust in scientists. I complicate both claims as to a crisis of trust and claims to the contrary by distinguishing between stated, introspected, and revealed epistemic trust. Drawing on these distinctions, I argue that survey data concerning trust in experts are ambiguous between various interpretations. Understanding the crisis of trust, or indeed determining whether there is such a crisis, hence depends on more carefully distinguishing between these interpretations.