2025/01/01 by Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander · 1 voice
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Economic theories and models #Economic Policies and Impacts
paper · doi:10.3982/te6247
openalex created_date 2020/12/07 · openalex publication_date 2025/01/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff‐relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.