2025/11/29 by Lei Liu · 1 voice
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Competitive and Knowledge Intelligence #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Military History and Strategy
paper · doi:10.1080/02684527.2025.2595028
openalex publication_date 2025/11/29 · openalex created_date 2025/11/30 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/14
In the 1970s, when Congress sought to enhance oversight on intelligence, it diverged from the conventional practice of establishing a standing committee or a joint committee, but chose to create a new permanent select committee on intelligence, which integrated features of both standing and select committees. The establishment of such committees was not merely a product of power struggles and compromises among existing standing committees that shared jurisdiction over intelligence; rather, it was intricately connected to the committees’ dual characteristics and distinctive organizational structures, and inherent requirements arising from the particularity of intelligence as the objects of congressional oversight. The power struggles and compromises concerning the formation of congressional intelligence committees have adversely impacted their subsequent development and operational efficacy.