2026/01/19 by Lai Ching Li · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Japanese History and Culture #Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/07075332.2026.2614614
openalex publication_date 2026/01/19 · openalex created_date 2026/01/21 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
During the U.S.–Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in the early 1980s, the Soviet proposal to redeploy SS-20 missiles from Europe to the Far East exposed the limitations of Japan’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and posed a direct threat to its national security. Existing scholarship has predominantly examined Japan’s response through the lens of the U.S.–Japan alliance or Western solidarity, often overlooking its geopolitical agency as a middle power. This article seeks to rectify this Euro-centric narrative by revealing how Japan leveraged its ‘Asian identity’ to reshape the superpower negotiation agenda. Drawing on a middle power theoretical framework and utilizing declassified multinational archives, this study examines how the Nakasone administration constructed a ‘loose geopolitical alignment’ with China and ASEAN. It demonstrates that Tokyo successfully transformed Asian security concerns into diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Washington, ultimately acting as a critical variable in securing the ‘Global Zero’ outcome. These findings illustrate that Japan was not a passive bystander; rather, by linking regional interests with global arms control, it exercised a substantive agenda-setting function within the bipolar system. This case not only fills a significant gap in Cold War history regarding Asia but also offers historical insights for understanding middle-power diplomacy in contemporary great power competition.