2025/10/21 by Ariane Ravier, Sébastien Konieczny, Stefano Moretti +1 · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · doi:10.3233/faia250872
openalex publication_date 2025/10/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Several methods have been introduced in the literature to extend preferences over items from a population to preferences over the groups they may form - a problem known as the Order Lifting problem. The converse matter of deducing preferences over items from expressed preferences over the coalitions that may be formed within a population - a problem known as the Social Ranking Problem - has also been studied more recently. In this paper, we investigate the links between these two problems: after an examination of the general case, we consider the impact of missing information, by studying which social ranking methods allow for the most accurate recovery of initial preferences over items, depending on the amount of missing information about coalitions. Finally, we consider the specific case in which preferences are only expressed over coalitions of same size, and examine the accuracy of social ranking methods when faced with impartial information about preferences over k-sized coalitions.