2026/03/18 by Murat Tınas, Doğukan Tuncal · 1 voice
Engineering · Social Sciences · #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Military History and Strategy #Military Strategy and Technology
paper · doi:10.1080/08850607.2026.2642168
openalex publication_date 2026/03/18 · openalex created_date 2026/03/20 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/14
Research on intelligence failures adopts three main approaches: the inadequate analysis of information, the impact of organizational and bureaucratic constraints, and the inefficiencies in intelligence collection. They primarily focus on strategic intelligence failures; however, they fall short of adequately addressing the complexities inherent in tactical and contemporary terrorism-related failures. The theory of preventive action offers a more comprehensive approach in this respect, suggesting that intelligence failures often derive from the lack of precise and actionable tactical-level warnings against surprise attacks, and the lack of policymaker receptivity. Although tactical intelligence is harder to collect compared to strategic intelligence, it promises greater usefulness and actionability. Within this theoretical framework, this study contends that failures in tactical-level intelligence derive from inadequate counterintelligence assessments of adversaries’ methods and the failure to identify own vulnerabilities, since it stands as a primary responsibility within defensive counterintelligence planning. To demonstrate this assertion, by using the Global Terrorism Database, this study employs Chi-squared and then Cramér’s V tests which enable the detection of significant associations between two categorical variables, to analyze how attack types and target types (independent variables) affect the success of surprise attacks (the dependent variable). Subsequently, this study will concentrate on Israel with the most radical rise in the 2024 ranking of countries most impacted by such attacks. Here, the methodology remains consistent, while broadening the scope to include additional independent variables, such as cities and perpetrating groups. Based on findings from both global and Israel-specific data, the study lastly will discuss the October 7 attack, confirming a significant relationship between surprise attacks and inadequate tactical-level counterintelligence assessments that overlook a variety of specified conditions carrying high potential threat levels. By doing so, this study aims both to contribute to the literature by diversifying the theory of preventive action through a defensive counterintelligence perspective and to establish a framework that helps practitioners in crafting more nuanced and precise assessments.