2019/11/23 by Conor Tobin · 1 voice · 3 citations
Social Sciences · #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Military History and Strategy #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
paper · doi:10.1093/dh/dhz065
openalex publication_date 2019/11/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
In an interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur in January 1998, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recounted that “according to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until now, is quite different: Indeed, it was on July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” This admission—corroborating previous disclosures by the CIA’s Charles Cogan and Robert Gates—was quite innocuous on its own, but Brzezinski was further quoted alleging that “on that day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention.” He admitted that the administration had “knowingly increased the probability” that the Soviets would intervene militarily, and maintained that he had no regrets as the “secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.” He added that on the “day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War,’” and boasted that “for almost ten years, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for the regime, a conflict that led to the demoralization and ultimately the breakup of the Soviet empire.”1