2026/01/01 by Anna Mazurkiewicz · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Soviet and Russian History
paper · doi:10.1162/jcws.a.1327
openalex publication_date 2026/01/01 · openalex created_date 2026/07/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Abstract In the late 1940s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ran a variety of psychological operations and clandestine actions behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA in its early years included two offices that oversaw covert programs in Poland: the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). From 1948 to 1952, the Communist regime in Poland successfully deceived the OSO and OPC into believing that they were supporting the anti-Communist underground network in Poland. Drawing on an invaluable account by a key insider—William J. Tonesk, a CIA officer of Polish ancestry—who worked at the Polish Branch within the OSO, this article reassesses the failure of U.S. intelligence operations in Poland by shifting attention away from émigré “paper mills” to the CIA's organizational setup marked by deficient coordination of activities and an unfavorable work culture.