British intelligence and the Dardanelles: the 1906 Taba affair revisited

2022/04/19 by Yusuf Ozkan · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Military History and Strategy #World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact

paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2055936

openalex publication_date 2022/04/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

This article revisits British assessments on the Dardanelles during and after the Taba crisis in 1906. It is known that the assessments produced throughout 1906 were pessimistic. What is missing from the current historiography is the intelligence dimension. This paper fills this gap by arguing that the assessments were pessimistic because military and political assessors knew that the Dardanelles defences were strong. They knew this fact because British intelligence departments had compiled detailed and accurate information demonstrating that the Dardanelles defence system had been modernised and strengthened by the Ottomans over the preceding three decades.

Discussions

• It’s worth adding my piece here doi.org/10.1080/0268... [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]

Related

• Missing the Bolt from the Blue: British Intelligence and the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919
• Total war and Ottoman military intelligence, 1914-1918: An inquiry into its expanding tasks through intelligence reports
• The Ottoman Military Intelligence Department and Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918
• Provident Imperialism: The De Bunsen Committee and British Language of Indirect Control over the Ottoman Empire
• Asymmetries and instabilities: Attaché intelligence liaison or ‘Legalised Spies’ in Stockholm and London during the Second World War?