2023/07/05 by Dustin Stokes · 1 voice
Neuroscience · Psychology · #Cognitive Science and Education Research #Categorization, perception, and language #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · pdf · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2023.10954
openalex publication_date 2023/07/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/15
The unifying theme across all four commentaries is the question: just how radical are the ideas contained in, and implied by, Thinking and Perceiving? Does the abandonment of the modularity of mind, and an embrace of the malleability of mind, have wide reaching consequences for empirical studies of sensory perception, for cognitive architecture, for the metaphysics of mind and the epistemology of perception? And which of those consequences are welcomed, and which of those are problematic? These general questions anchor in (at least) the following topics: learning and the role of cognition, object recognition, perceptual expertise, early versus late vision, perception and truth, virtue epistemology, and computational architectures of mind. This reply attempts to address the overarching question from this variety of angles taken in the four commentaries.