2020/12/28 by Dora Gicheva · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #School Choice and Performance #Higher Education Research Studies
paper · doi:10.1177/0019793920981055
openalex publication_date 2020/12/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
This article explores why many public school teachers work substantially more hours than required by contract, given that the elasticity of their earnings with respect to their hours is close to zero. The author introduces a theoretical framework for public-sector employees in which high levels of effort can indicate either altruism (for intrinsically motivated employees) or low productivity (for low-ability employees). Because intrinsically motivated employees derive higher utility from working in the public sector, they are less likely to exit it. Over time, selection makes high levels of effort more strongly predictive of altruism than of low ability. Findings show that teachers with very low levels of experience exhibit little or no relationship between weekly hours and the probability of remaining in teaching. This correlation becomes more positive as teaching experience increases. Similarly, the level of work hours is positively related to self-reported burnout at low levels of experience, but the relationship is reversed for teachers who have been in the profession longer.