Anticipating moral hazard undermines climate mitigation in an experimental geoengineering game

2022/03/25 by Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, Reuben Kline · 1 voice · 2 citations
Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #Climate Change Communication and Perception #Climate Change and Geoengineering #Risk Perception and Management

paper · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107421

openalex publication_date 2022/03/25 · crossref created 2022/03/25 · crossref issued 2022/06/01 · crossref published 2022/06/01 · crossref published-print 2022/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref deposited 2025/10/13 · crossref indexed 2026/07/30 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31

Citations

• The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
• Deliberative Mapping of options for tackling climate change: Citizens and specialists ‘open up’ appraisal of geoengineering

Cited by

• Balanced Messaging about Solar Geoengineering does not Reduce Average Support for Emissions Reductions
• The potential environmental and climate impacts of stratospheric aerosol injection: a review

Discussions

• "...policymakers expect that citizens will engage in moral hazard. As a consequence, policymakers do not use geoengineering even though everyone would be better off if they did so. Anticipating moral [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]