2017/01/01 by Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan · 1 voice · 30 citations
Arts and Humanities · Computer Science · #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) #Philosophy and History of Science
paper · pdf · doi:10.4230/lipics.itcs.2017.43
openalex publication_date 2017/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Recent discussion in the public sphere about algorithmic classification has involved tension between competing notions of what it means for a probabilistic classification to be fair to different groups. We formalize three fairness conditions that lie at the heart of these debates, and we prove that except in highly constrained special cases, there is no method that can satisfy these three conditions simultaneously. Moreover, even satisfying all three conditions approximately requires that the data lie in an approximate version of one of the constrained special cases identified by our theorem. These results suggest some of the ways in which key notions of fairness are incompatible with each other, and hence provide a framework for thinking about the trade-offs between them.