2022/02/02 by Patrice Bougette, Axel Gautier, Frédéric Marty · 1 voice
Business, Management and Accounting · #Corporate Governance and Law
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpac005
openalex publication_date 2022/02/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Self-preferencing can be defined as an envelopment strategy in which ‘the enveloper might enter the target market and, at the same time, bend the origin platform’s rules to provide a better outcome for its own products or services’.1 The relevance of the concept of self-preferencing is particularly controversial in competition law and economics. Although not referred to in the Google Shopping judgment,2 the notion of self-preferencing appears to play a significant role in the ruling, which justifies examining it in the light of Industrial Organisation (IO) literature. Conceived as a theory of competitive damage, self-preferencing may be emphasised in many cases related to the digital sector. These are ones of EU Commission Google Shopping3 and Google Android4 decisions, the proceedings against Amazon,5 the ones initiated against Apple,6 the decision of the Italian competition authority against the same company in December 2021,7 or the ongoing proceedings before the French competition authority relating to Apple’s measures on tracking tools from third-party applications.8