2022/01/01 by Jacob M. Grumbach, Jamila Michener · 25 citations
Social Sciences · #Accountability #Decentralization #Democracy #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Federalism #Inequality #Law #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Populism, Right-Wing Movements #Public administration #Social and Cultural Dynamics #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1177/00027162211070885
published in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 699(1), 143-155 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2022/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
The United States has a particularly decentralized form of federalism that provides important authority to multiple levels of government. This decentralization is typically seen as beneficial for democratic politics. But while federalism both constrains and enables democratic participation, we argue that it does so unevenly, and in ways that deepen inequalities in the processes of democracy. We propose four mechanisms by which the institutional decentralization of American federalism obstructs or reduces democratic accountability and equality: (1) inequality in venue selection, (2) information asymmetry, (3) an unequal exit threat, and (4) decentralized accountability. In contemporary American politics, these mechanisms both create and expand advantages for economic and political elites, while generating and deepening barriers to the full and equitable inclusion of less powerful groups in society, especially economically and racially marginalized Americans.