2025/06/20 by Olga Masyutina · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development #Political Conflict and Governance #Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/13597566.2025.2520977
openalex publication_date 2025/06/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Corruption is the nexus of diverse strategies of power preservation in autocracies. It can be used to both co-opt elites and to sideline rivals. The fight against corruption can also become an important legitimation instrument. In this paper, I study the role of anti-corruption prosecution of local elites in power dynamics in Russia’s authoritarian federalist system. Using data on 109 Russian mayors charged with corruption between 2002 and 2022, I look at idiosyncratic motivations behind corruption charges and distinguish between politically motivated and performance-driven anti-corruption. I find that politically motivated repression is connected to a conflict between a mayor and local, regional or federal elites and is used to repress inconvenient mayors. Performance-driven anti-corruption relates to federal-level policies and incentives: an anti-corruption drive to signal responsiveness and repressiveness as well as performance incentives for security services. In the end, anti-corruption contributes to further consolidation and centralization of political authority.