2023/04/18 by David Fortunato, Joshua McCrain, Kaylyn Jackson Schiff · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Public Policy and Administration Research
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/spq.2023.6
openalex publication_date 2023/04/18 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Abstract Evidence suggests that well-funded, professional legislatures more effectively provide constituents with their preferred policies and may improve social welfare. Yet, legislative resources across state legislatures have stagnated or dwindled at least in part due to public antagonism toward increasing representatives’ salaries. We argue that one reason voters oppose legislative resources, like salary and staff, is that they are unaware of the potential benefits. Employing a pre-registered survey experiment with a pre–post design, we find that subjects respond positively to potential social welfare benefits of professionalization, increasing support for greater resources. We also find that individuals identifying with the legislative majority party respond positively to potential responsiveness benefits and that out-partisans do not respond negatively to potential responsiveness costs. In a separate survey of political elites, we find similar patterns. These results suggest that a key barrier to increasing legislative professionalism – anticipated public backlash – may not be insurmountable. The findings also highlight a challenge of institutional choice: beliefs that representatives are unresponsive or ineffective lead to governing institutions that may ensure these outcomes.