2025/12/19 by Maria Waggoner · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Free Will and Agency #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #War, Ethics, and Justification
paper · doi:10.3998/phimp.7356
openalex created_date 2025/12/19 · openalex publication_date 2025/12/19 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/01
This paper investigates the relationship between the content of one's intrusive thoughts—such as intentionally swerving into oncoming traffic—and one's values. I first consider two approaches that are already on the table within empirical and philosophical literature – either one's intrusive thoughts indicate a moral failure of the person who has them, or they are to be seen as noise and to be disregarded. After pointing out problems with these approaches, I propose another avenue which builds on the finding that intrusive thoughts often occur in situations of increased uncertainty and social isolation when our agency would otherwise be threatened. By employing a social account of agency, I suggest that some instances of intrusive thoughts could play the role of an 'other.' Under this proposal, at least some intrusive thoughts would serve a surprising function of helping us to manifest our values and uphold our agency.