2026/07/07 by Jimena Valdez · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Health Professions · #Digital Economy and Work Transformation #Employment and Welfare Studies #Labor Movements and Unions
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s1537592726104721
openalex publication_date 2026/07/07 · openalex created_date 2026/07/08 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Platform firms have disrupted markets and challenged regulatory frameworks, but a new phase is emerging in which governments increasingly regulate these firms and firms engage with regulation strategically. This article examines how interactions between governments and firms shape the employment classification of platform workers. Drawing on case studies of California (United States), Spain, and Denmark, I show that welfare regime characteristics structure the regulatory environment that firms confront, whereas their competitive calculations shape their strategic responses. The analysis identifies three distinct configurations: successful firm override of government initiatives to classify workers as employees, resulting in a hybrid worker category (California); mixed firm responses to government initiatives aimed at employee classification, ultimately leading to universal employee status (Spain); and voluntary employee classification in the absence of specific government mandates (Denmark). These findings challenge assumptions that platform firms uniformly resist regulation and demonstrate how welfare state institutions and firms’ competitive strategies jointly shape worker classification outcomes.