2026/05/09 by William Bendix, Gyung‐Ho Jeong · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Populism, Right-Wing Movements
paper · doi:10.1093/fpa/orag023
openalex publication_date 2026/05/09 · openalex created_date 2026/07/09 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/09
Abstract Research shows that hawkish members of Congress enjoy greater legislative success in shaping US foreign policy than their dovish counterparts, regardless of party control of the executive or legislative branches. This congressional bias, combined with the well-documented hawkishness of presidents, has raised concerns about the militarization of American foreign policy. Using mixed methods to capture less visible forms of influence, we examine whether congressional doves secure legislative gains on issues where, in theory, they should hold a relative advantage. In doing so, we assess whether they can overcome the hawkish bias of Congress and the presidency. Our findings, however, reveal a persistent pattern of dovish failure from 1973 to 2022. Across broad categories of bills, specific types of amendments, statistical analyses, and qualitative evidence, we find no consistent legislative success for doves. We conclude that a hawkish bias persists across issues, suggesting stable bipartisan support for a muscular foreign policy.