The disproportional consequences of a proportional bargain: candidate selection within Italian electoral coalitions in 2022

2025/11/11 by Gianni Del Panta, Mattia Guidi, Tristan Klingelhöfer · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Systems and Governance #Populism, Right-Wing Movements

paper · doi:10.1080/13608746.2025.2573697

openalex publication_date 2025/11/11 · openalex created_date 2025/11/12 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15

Abstract

While disproportionality is traditionally attributed to the confluence of electoral system dynamics and the distribution of party support, this article identifies an additional mechanism: the allocation of candidacies among pre-electoral coalition partners. We analyse the 2022 Italian election and show that intra-coalition disproportionality (especially on the right) resulted from an ostensibly proportional bargaining agreement, which was later undermined by shifts in party support between the time of candidate allocation and election day. We reflect on the broader implications of intra-coalition disproportionality for parliamentary representation and government formation and outline which parts of our argument extend beyond the 2022 Italian election.

Citations

• Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
• Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems

Discussions

• In sum, the politics of pre-electoral coalition formation can increase disproportionality, particularly when voters decide late. The phenomenon is not limited to the Italian case, just particularly vi [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]

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