2025/12/19 by Carola Klöck, Paula Castro · 1 voice
Psychology · Social Sciences · #Conflict Management and Negotiation #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Team Dynamics and Performance
paper · doi:10.1163/15718069-bja10126
openalex publication_date 2025/12/19 · openalex created_date 2025/12/20 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Abstract Despite the formal equality of all states, in practice, international negotiations are highly unequal. In particular, small delegation size limits countries’ capacity to meaningfully engage with complex global processes. Yet, delegation size is an insufficient indicator of negotiation capacity. We argue that we also need to pay attention to delegation composition. Indeed, we propose that small delegation size can be compensated by including non-governmental delegates, by sending more senior and experienced negotiators, and by sending the same delegates over time. We use the example of climate negotiations to map and explore the interlinkages between delegation size and delegation composition. Our quantitative analysis across all countries, as well as a focus on Seychelles and Mauritius, shows that countries do indeed seek to compensate for small delegation size. Yet, these compensation mechanisms, especially sending more senior negotiators and maintaining delegation continuity, require resources that not all Parties have.