2026/02/05 by Hao Shen · 1 voice
Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #Environmental law and policy #International Environmental Law and Policies #World Trade Organization Law
paper · doi:10.1080/1523908x.2026.2625845
openalex publication_date 2026/02/05 · openalex created_date 2026/02/07 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Procuratorial public interest litigation has become a vital legal mechanism for advancing environmental protection in China. Although public authorities are mandated by law to safeguard the public interest, enforcement bodies often lack the capacity or willingness to act effectively. Traditional public law enforcement focuses primarily on injunctions and administrative penalties, offering limited pathways for environmental remediation. To address these shortcomings, this article proposes two theoretical models of public interest litigation. The first targets administrative inaction by holding public authorities accountable for failing to fulfill their statutory duties. The second addresses the insufficiency of restorative measures in public law enforcement by seeking to impose substantive environmental obligations. Within this evolving framework, procuratorial organs play a pivotal role in compelling government agencies to act in the public interest. However, their authority to initiate environmental compensation claims remains contested and underdeveloped. The dynamic relationships among prosecutors, administrative bodies, NGOs, and private actors also raise concerns about constrained public participation under China’s model of ‘authoritarian environmentalism.’ By analyzing the institutional functions and limitations of procuratorial litigation, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of how China is reshaping environmental governance through legal innovation while grappling with issues of transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement.