2026/01/31 by Tammy Harel Ben Shahar · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Political Philosophy and Ethics
paper · doi:10.16995/pp.26050
openalex publication_date 2026/01/31 · openalex created_date 2026/02/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
The orthodox position in the literature on positional goods posits that although positional competitions are socially undesirable, inefficient, and unfair, individuals are reasonable and justified to engage in them. Contrary to that position, this paper argues that individuals almost always have a prima facie moral duty to “lean out,” namely, to avoid engaging in positional competitions. The paper puts forward three arguments in support of this duty: that positional competitions involve winning for the wrong reasons; that competing in positional competitions involves showing disregard to other people’s projects, thereby failing to act in solidarity with them; and that engaging in positional competitions involves behaving coercively towards other competitors. After presenting the three arguments, the paper delineates the proper scope of the duty to lean out, ensuring that it is not overdemanding.