2026/01/01 by Yogesh M. Joshi (1636813), Rohan Mukherjee · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economic Sanctions and International Relations #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Nuclear Issues and Defense
paper · doi:10.1162/isec.a.406
openalex publication_date 2026/01/01 · openalex created_date 2026/06/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/20
Abstract Since the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the bomb in the 1940s, the common wisdom has been that each new proliferator would trigger its regional rivals and competitors to follow suit. Yet the incidence of such reactive proliferation is low. Scholars typically attribute this gap between expectation and reality to resource constraints and potential backlash from powerful allies and adversaries. These factors, however, only focus on the cost of nuclear pursuit. We focus on the other side of the equation, the cost of nuclear restraint or not pursuing the bomb, which derives from a state's assessments of the degree of nuclear threat that a rival poses. States are most likely to reactively proliferate when a proliferating rival has extensive aims and inferior conventional capabilities, factors that combine to make nuclear restraint costlier than pursuing the bomb. We demonstrate this theoretical insight's validity using interviews and new archival evidence pertaining to India's divergent assessments of China and Pakistan as nuclear threats. Our findings address the long-standing puzzle of why India did not pursue nuclear weapons in response to China's rapid nuclearization in the 1960s but acquired them in the late 1980s in response to Pakistan's acquisition.