2026/05/22 by Kyle Fiore Law, Seoyeon Bae, Liane Young +1 · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Social and Intergroup Psychology #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Cultural Differences and Values
paper · doi:10.1111/pops.70158
openalex publication_date 2026/05/22 · openalex created_date 2026/05/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/24
Abstract Do liberals prioritize distant others over close relationships, inverting the moral hierarchy? Across three studies, we test this claim directly. Study 1a analyzes a nationally representative U.S. sample ( N = 1000). Study 1b reanalyzes four Prolific samples ( N = 3201). Study 2 preregisters a new sample ( N = 899) using both unconstrained Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) ratings and a fixed‐resource allocation task. Across all studies and ideological groups, ingroups consistently receive the highest moral concern. In unconstrained settings, greater concern for distant entities does not predict reduced concern for close others; ideological differences reflect how far moral concern extends outward, not compromised ingroup prioritization. When concern is treated as a fixed resource, tradeoffs emerge as expected: allocating more to distant targets means allocating less elsewhere. However, even under constraint, ingroups remain the top priority across the political spectrum; liberals simply reallocate more toward distant categories than conservatives do. These findings challenge claims of moral inversion and clarify that liberal moral universalism reflects circle expansion, not reversal in the ordering of concern.