2020/03/13 by Joshua Malay, Matthew R. Fairholm · 1 voice
Business, Management and Accounting · Environmental Science · #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Forest Management and Policy #Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
paper · doi:10.1177/0275074020911783
openalex publication_date 2020/03/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
The main question this article seeks to address is how the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) bureaucratic autonomy is affected by deep ideological divides over public lands management policy. Daniel Carpenter’s theory of bureaucratic autonomy serves to provide the definition and method for evaluating the research question. The case study identifies that the bureaucratic autonomy afforded the BLM is intrinsically bound to interest group politics. There exists little room for initiative not supported by specific interests. Actions required by the multiple use mandate, but not supported by interests, will be suppressed. But, of greater interest in understanding the BLM, once support shifts for an initiative, all previous action is undone or at least mitigated to a point of inconsequence. Hence, limited bureaucratic autonomy is afforded either way, as the multiple use requirement will not satisfy all parties and does not allow the BLM to ignore other potential uses of the public lands.