Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators

1972/10/01 by Alan Kirman, Alan P Kirman, Dieter Sondermann · 1 voice · 7 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90106-8

crossref issued 1972/10/01 · crossref published 1972/10/01 · crossref published-print 1972/10/01 · openalex publication_date 1972/10/01 · crossref created 2005/02/10 · crossref deposited 2019/01/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/06/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23

Cited by

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• An Abstract Algebraic Logic View on Judgment Aggregation
• Hilbert’s Fifth Problem and Related Topics
• Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
• Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Measuring Intelligence and Growth Rate: Variations on Hibbard’s Intelligence Measure

Discussions

• The locus classicus of this result is Kirman and Sondermann's 1972 paper doi.org/10.1016/0022... but the results were later seen to be generalisable to algebras of coalitions doi.org/10.1016/0304... [bsky, 2 points, 1 comments]