2024/07/10 by Alba Massolo · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Medieval and Classical Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · pdf · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96708
openalex publication_date 2024/07/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Principle of Bivalence: On the one hand, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and, on the other hand, supervaluation semantics. I also address some criticisms made against these two proposals. To finish, I remark on some alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s intentions maintaining that the Stagirite philosopher rejected fatalism without abandoning the Principle of Bivalence.