2024/12/27 by Giacomo Battiston, Matteo Bizzarri, Riccardo Franceschin · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Natural Resources and Economic Development
paper · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635
openalex publication_date 2024/12/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.