2022/05/06 by Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, F. Daniel Hidalgo, Yuri Kasahara · 1 voice · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development #Media Influence and Politics #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
paper · doi:10.1017/s0007123421000727
openalex publication_date 2022/05/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Abstract When do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral election in Brazil where a reputable interest group declared both candidates corrupt. We distributed fliers in the runoff mayoral election in São Paulo. Informing voters about the challenger's record reduced turnout by 1.9 percentage points and increased the opponent's vote by 2.6 percentage points. Informing voters about the incumbent's record had no effect on behavior. We attribute this divergent finding to differences in how each candidate's supporters view corruption. Using survey data and a survey experiment, we show that the challenger's supporters are more willing to punish their candidate for corruption, while the incumbent's supporters lack this inclination.