Public accountability and auditing: Why and when do state auditors conduct broad audits?

2024/06/24 by Dana Natan Krup, Shlomo Mizrahi · 1 voice · 2 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance #Risk Management in Financial Firms #Public Policy and Administration Research

paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/padm.13012

openalex publication_date 2024/06/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21

Abstract

Abstract Public servants who monitor and supervise the administrative and political systems must consider the extent to which they are willing to stretch the boundaries of their role for holding public servants accountable. We develop an analytical framework of the factors that influence the decisions of such officials, focusing on state auditors. Using new institutionalism, we suggest that the social, cultural, and political context figures more prominently in state auditors' strategic calculations than purely professional considerations or individual factors. This bottom‐up perspective sheds new light on the role of such officials in democratic systems, and their dependence on citizens' awareness and active support in promoting accountability. We illustrate the theoretical framework using examples from Israel.

Citations

• Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
• The Social Transformation of Trust in Government
• The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy

Cited by

• Making nonpunitive accountability matter: Exploring behavioral effects of nonpunitive accountability in a conjoint experiment
• Performance Auditing Trends at a Supreme Audit Institution: UK National Audit Office, 1999 to 2021

Discussions

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