2024/01/02 by Kael McCormack · 1 voice
Psychology · Neuroscience · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Free Will and Agency
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2296589
openalex publication_date 2024/01/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
I defend a view of the attitude of desire against a close rival. Both views are versions of “the guise of the good” thesis. The guise of the good says that a desire for P involves P appearing good in some respect. I defend a content-based account of value appearances against an attitude-based account. On the content view, a desire for P represents P as good while the attitude of that desire presents P’s value as true. In other words, a desire for P presents it as true that P is good.Footnote1 The attitude view says that a desire represents P non-evaluatively while the attitude of that desire presents P as good. In other words, a desire for P presents P as good. The attitude view struggles to explain the relationship between the qualitative character of desires and appearances of value. It must either implausibly deny that there is a close relationship between the two, or explain the relationship by introducing a poorly motivated, revisionist mental ontology. In the present state of the debate between the two views, this problem tips the scales in favor of the content view.