2026/03/23 by Jazmin Sidney · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Environmental Science · Arts and Humanities · #Interdisciplinary Cultural and Social Studies #Science and Climate Studies #Evolution and Science Education
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2648683
openalex publication_date 2026/03/23 · openalex created_date 2026/03/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
The Good True Self (GTS) theory holds that we typically think others are truly good. It is well supported by research showing that participants consistently judge others’ good actions as more revealing of who they truly are than their bad actions. Faraci and Shoemaker are doubtful. They present two counterexamples in which people link the true self with badness and suggest that, rather than assuming inner goodness, people may simply give wrongdoers the “benefit of the doubt.” One counterexample is irrelevant, and their alternative hypothesis cannot explain the data. The remaining counterexample, however, challenges the mechanism underlying the GTS theory: the inclination to treat goodness as more revealing than badness. If this prioritization of goodness were inconsistent or easily outweighed, exceptions would be common, undermining the theory. To defend the GTS theory, I develop an account of exceptions, introducing a sensitivity to negativity that operates alongside the prioritization of goodness in true-self assessment. Exceptions arise not because this prioritization is absent, but because it is outweighed by negativity, meaning that it operates consistently. Yet I show that the conditions for outweighing are seldom met, so exceptions are rare and our tendency to see others as truly good is preserved.