2025/08/08 by Kai M. Thaler · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Military History and Strategy #Peacebuilding and International Security #International Relations and Foreign Policy
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/09636412.2025.2572637
openalex publication_date 2025/08/08 · openalex created_date 2025/11/07 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/14
Revolutionary regimes may prove durable over time, yet they are often weak and militarily ineffective after victory. How do the circumstances of victory shape these weaknesses? Where old regime security forces persist, I argue that revolutionary regimes will focus on coup-proofing, creating vulnerabilities to insurgent or foreign threats. If old regime security forces disintegrate but rebel rivals remain, revolutionaries will likely focus on counterinsurgency, potentially neglecting external threats. Absent old regime forces and rebel rivals, revolutionaries will focus on external defense, neglecting possible domestic threats. I inductively develop this theory through case studies of Nicaragua, where old regime forces dissolved, and Iran, where they survived. Nicaragua’s externally focused revolutionary regime let insurgencies develop, while only invading Iraqi forces’ hesitancy saved Iran’s coup-proofing regime. This study reinforces the importance of security forces in revolutionary transitions and suggests that revolutionary regimes’ early, weak period is when international engagement could be most impactful.