2025/09/06 by Pablo Hubacher Haerle · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Free Will and Agency #Philosophical Ethics and Theory
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzaf057
openalex publication_date 2025/09/06 · openalex created_date 2025/12/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Abstract There is an epistemic limit on rational inquiry. This follows from that fact that inquiries are intentional actions. I argue that it is epistemically irrational to inquire into questions when you cannot rationally believe that you will be successful in your inquiry. Accordingly, I defend a new norm of inquiry: the Success Norm for Inquiry (SUN). An important upshot of the discussion is that there will be cases where epistemic rationality mandates suspension of judgement but prevents further inquiry. Sometimes accepting uncertainty, while doing nothing to resolve it, is the only rational option.