2026/01/01 by Mari Aburamoto, Masatomo Torikai · 2 voices
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Conflict and Governance #Populism, Right-Wing Movements
paper · doi:10.5129/001041526x17818152210375
openalex publication_date 2026/01/01 · openalex created_date 2026/07/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Why do authoritarian regimes tolerate minor opposition parties with little chance of winning power? This article argues that such parties persist because regimes deliberately structure political competition. Minor opposition parties enhance regime stability through two mechanisms. First, they boost electoral legitimacy by broadening political choice and sustaining the appearance of competition without threatening control. Second, they reduce electoral uncertainty by fragmenting opposition support, imitating major challengers, and occupying ideological niches. Focusing on Russia after the 2012 party registration reform, which sharply increased the number of parties, the analysis draws on an original dataset of 367 regional legislative elections (2003–2024). It shows that minor parties are more prevalent in politically vulnerable regions, increase turnout, weaken stronger opposition forces, and reinforce authoritarian resilience.