Penalty Kicks in Soccer

2007/09/04 by Germán Coloma · 1 voice · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Game Theory and Applications #Sports Analytics and Performance #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

paper · doi:10.1177/1527002506289648

openalex publication_date 2007/09/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21

Abstract

This article uses the model proposed by Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose to test for mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game between a kicker and a goalkeeper in the situation of a penalty kick in soccer. The main contribution of this article is to develop an alternative testing methodology on the basis of the use of a simultaneous-equation regression approach that directly tests the equilibrium conditions. Using the same data as Chiappori et al., the author finds results similar to theirs and also separately analyzes the behavior of different types of players (classified according to which foot they use to kick the ball and to the strategies they choose to mix).

Citations

• Non-Cooperative Games

Cited by

• Testing mixed strategies in the field: an experiment with soccer penalty kicks

Discussions

• Day 30/39 Re-testing penalty-kick data with a new method confirms kickers and keepers play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, reinforcing game theory's real-world predictive power. Coloma 2007 🔗 do [bsky, 2 points, 0 comments]

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