2024/09/09 by Irina Schumski · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Political Philosophy and Ethics
paper · doi:10.1086/731425
openalex publication_date 2024/09/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Critics often accuse Kant and Kantians of rigorism: of advocating highly general exceptionless principles of duty that strictly prohibit action kinds like lying or breaking promises. In this article, I draw on arguments from the generalism-particularism debate to show that the way in which Kantians usually understand universality prevents them from solving this problem and leaves them stuck in a trilemma. I then argue that they should abandon this common conception—the “strict conception,” on which universal principles don’t permit any exceptions—in favor of a “relaxed conception,” on which universal principles do permit certain exceptions, namely principled exceptions.