2024/10/18 by Ryan Pevnick · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Intellectual Property Law
paper · doi:10.16995/pp.17029
openalex created_date 2024/10/18 · openalex publication_date 2024/10/18 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
In light of mounting concerns about democratic backsliding, Rawls’s work – which has an unusual focus on considerations of stability – is now being mined for insights about democratic fragility. This paper begins by arguing that the key mechanism underlying Rawls’s account of stability cannot, consistent with a proper recognition of the burdens of judgment, explain what makes democratic stability possible. It is, therefore, not well-positioned to help us to think productively about how to mitigate the risk of backsliding. Building on an influential literature in political science, I describe an alternative way of thinking about what enables democratic stability that focuses on the importance of giving key actors self-interested reasons for compliance. This account provides a more productive framework for understanding the causes, and thinking about how to mitigate the risk, of backsliding. It should, therefore, contribute to how we evaluate political institutions and proposed reforms.