2025/12/27 by Walter Veit · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · doi:10.1177/10597123251413204
openalex created_date 2025/12/27 · openalex publication_date 2025/12/27 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
In this article, I defend and expand my evolutionary account of consciousness developed in A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness against four critical replies. I respond to de Weerd’s challenge to the evolutionary bottom-up approach, clarifying what it entails. I address Sachs’s discussion of autopoiesis and enactivism, distinguishing my naturalistic framework from these alternatives. I engage Frankish’s concerns about my remaining Cartesian commitments. I reply to Suzuki’s prediction-based alternative to my evaluation-first view of consciousness, his criticism of my discussion of disunity, and his scepticism that consciousness is an adaptation. Finally, I address Chincarini’s comments on the connection between the pathological complexity thesis and animal welfare science.