2024/09/05 by David Sackris · 1 voice
Neuroscience · Social Sciences · Psychology · #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Psychology of Social Influence #Emotions and Moral Behavior
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2395368
openalex publication_date 2024/09/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judgment is not a distinctive kind of judgment or the result of a specific, identifiable cognitive process. I argue that if this conclusion is largely correct, the moral-conventional distinction loses significance. If moral judgment does not correspond to a distinctive cognitive process, it is unclear how distinguishing between types of norms tracks anything of significance to human judgment formation. I then discuss the implications of abandoning the distinction for research in the field of moral psychology and tentatively propose a more modest way of conceiving of norm significance.