2025/11/15 by Ismail Misbahu · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Arts and Humanities · #Colonial History and Postcolonial Studies #Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics #Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
paper · doi:10.1080/03086534.2025.2575838
openalex publication_date 2025/11/15 · openalex created_date 2025/11/15 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
In the period 1950–1960 a greater concern about Muslim sensibilities in northern Nigeria and consciousness among Muslims in the southwest (Yoruba land) was on the increase. The question of how this influenced Nasser’s Islamic propaganda as well as shaped the British politics of power transfer in this period has been overlooked. Previous studies have explained the reasons why the British took the option to fix the northern region first and delayed independence to 1960. But the significance of Egypt under Gemal Abdel Nasser in understanding the British decision for this delay was obviously discounted. This paper uses sources that were hitherto unarchived to demonstrate the extent to which the British claim to fix the northern region and protect it from domination by a minority Christian educated elite in Lagos’ was influenced by Nasser’s Islamic nationalism. Side-by-side with ‘northernisation policy agenda’, I argue that this action was part of the British strategy to prevent Muslims from appealing to Nasser political Islam. These sources are essentially primary but secondary sources are also utilized. Relevant to the primary data are a number of British colonial archives removed to London during 1950–1960. Secondary sources (in the form of published books, journal articles, newspapers, etcetera) are used to offer descriptive insights into the subject matter. By analysing both the primary and secondary sources, I posit that the decision to delay independence to 1960 was rather a favour for the British, not for the northern region, as it was made to appear in the historiography of Nigeria’s decolonisation. The British authorities prioritised fixing the north because of their concern over the appeal of Muslims to Nasser’s political Islam – as the latter was making it more likely that the north could secede from the Federation and join Nasser’s Egypt.