2024/07/02 by Leonardo Bandarra, Carmen Wunderlich · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies #Global Peace and Security Dynamics #Nuclear Issues and Defense
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/10736700.2025.2569147
openalex publication_date 2024/07/02 · openalex created_date 2025/12/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
Why and how do states establish nuclear-weapon-free or nuclear-deterrence-based security orders? In this article we address this question by examining the dynamics that influence states’ decisions to accept or reject nuclear deterrence. To this end, we focus on regional contexts in the Global South, while also incorporating aspects of constructivism, social psychology, and symbolism of world order into our analysis. We explore how a mindset of mutual trust among elites can ground stable nuclear-weapon-free security orders, in contrast to the mindset of dominating mistrust that prevails in nuclear-deterrence-based security orders. We define “trust” as a leap of faith in which “betrayal” is a possibility. This leap of faith is socially constructed and context dependent. To assess both features, we developed a three-level analytical framework, examining contextual, cognitive, and operational elements of security orders. To apply our model, we analyze developments in Latin America and South Asia from the 1960s to the early 2000s, highlighting their distinct paths in establishing nuclear-weapon-free and nuclear-deterrence-based security orders, respectively. Methodologically, we combine historical analysis, process tracing, document research, and interviews. In the concluding section we offer a comparative analysis of the two regions and suggest avenues for future research.